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I: Introduction  
Many Americans experienced a loss of income due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The 
sudden income shock had the most drastic immediate effect on lower-income households and 
people of color (Parker, 2020; Lee, et al., 2021). As of December 2020, there were about 3.2 
million homeowners struggling to pay their monthly bills (Choi & Pang, 2020). For people who 
own homes, their mortgage is often the largest monthly expense. Homeowners who cannot make 
their mortgage payments may eventually face foreclosure. Stopping foreclosures is important not 
only to keep families in their homes, but because foreclosures have negative externalities for 
communities including increased crime, decreasing neighboring property values, and eventually 
more foreclosures (Chan, et al., 2014).  
The Coronavirus Aid Relief and Economic Security Act (CARES), passed by Congress 
to assist Americans facing sudden and drastic income loss, provides distressed homeowners with 
a temporary break from making mortgage payments. Forbearance is a temporary halt of 
mandatory payments, with the missed payments repaid or restructured at the end of the 
forbearance period.1 Under the CARES Act, any homeowner with a federally insured mortgage 
may request a halt on payments for 180 days (6 months), which can be extended up to 18 months 
(Consumer Financial Protection bureau, 2021). Private lenders of loans that are not federally 
insured may choose to offer forbearance, and at the beginning of the COVID pandemic in April 
2020, 9 percent of all mortgages were in forbearance (Farrell, et al., 2020). However, not all 
homeowners experiencing financial distress had their mortgages in forbearance. Research by 
 
1 The missed monthly payments during a forbearance are either due as a lump sum at the end of the forbearance 
period, paid back by increasing the next few monthly payments made, or tacked on at the end of the loan. Financial 
institutions with federally backed mortgages are not allowed by the CARES Act to make borrowers pay back their 
missed payments as a lump sum (Consumer Finance Protection Bureau, 2020). This restriction does not apply to 
borrowers with non-federally backed mortgages. 
 
 
JPMorgan Chase found that 2% of their active borrowers were missing payments and not in 
forbearance (Farrell, et al., 2020). Some of these borrowers may be people who did not qualify 
for forbearance because their financial hardship started before the pandemic and was unrelated to 
the crisis. However, others may be people who were simply unaware of forbearance options.  
Survey evidence from Fannie Mae suggests that Black and Hispanic borrowers may appear 
disproportionately in the group of homeowners who are not in forbearance because they are not 
aware that it is an option; 65% of Hispanic, 51% of Black and 41% of white respondents were 
not familiar with mortgage relief options (Duncan, 2020). 
 During the COVID pandemic, interest rates also dropped to historic lows, making 
refinancing a smart option for many homeowners (Freddie Mac, 2021). By refinancing a 
mortgage at a lower interest rate, homeowners may be able to reduce their monthly mortgage 
payments and reduce the amount of time it takes to repay their loan. However, not all 
homeowners take advantage of record low interest rates. Common barriers to refinancing include 
unemployment, inability to cover closing costs, low credit scores, and delinquency, which are 
more common amongst low-income and minority homeowners (Keys, et al, 2016; DeFusco & 
Mondragon, 2020). 
It is important to understand the barriers to forbearance and refinancing during the 
COVID-19 pandemic, and how to make financially optimal options more accessible. There is 
concern that disparate take-up of forbearance and refinancing options will exacerbate existing 
inequities in homeownership, particularly for Black and Hispanic homeowners. Preliminary 
research shows that the pandemic is likely to cause worse mortgage outcomes for Black and 
Hispanic homeowners than for white homeowners (Cornelissen & Herman, 2020; Cohen, 2020). 
According to the Fannie Mae National Housing Survey from June 2020, 53% of Hispanic and 
 
 
42% of Black respondents were worried about being able to pay their monthly bills, significantly 
more than the 26% of white respondents who were worried (Duncan, 2020). Therefore, it is vital 
to know what factors predict the use of different mortgage options for low-income homeowners 
during the COVID-19 pandemic and whether they vary by race. 
In this paper, I use data from the Ohio Housing Finance Agency (OHFA)’s first time 
homeowner program to determine which factors predict the use of different mortgage options for 
low and moderate income (LMI) homeowners during the COVID-19 pandemic and whether the 
predictive power of these factors varies by race. LMI homeowners are of particular interest 
because prior research has shown that lower income homeowners are less likely than higher 
income homeowners to be aware of their options and make financially optimal decisions (Bucks 
& Pence, 2008; Bhutta et al., 2020). The OHFA affordable loan product studied in this paper 
holds constant mortgage characteristics such as interest rate, securitization, and servicer that 
typically vary between borrowers, and which may be difficult to otherwise observe, creating 
omitted variable bias which is not present in this study. This is important because previous 
studies have found that these factors affect whether borrowers take up mortgage assistance 
programs or refinance their loans (Lambie-Hanson & Reid, 2018; Collins, et al., 2011). 
I model the competing and mutually exclusive mortgage outcomes using multinomial 
logistic regressions. I find that Black homeowners were more likely default before the onset of 
the COVID-19 pandemic, then more likely to opt into forbearance and less likely to refinance 
than white homeowners after the onset of the pandemic. There are several other variables that 
follow the same pattern as the difference in outcomes between Black and white borrowers. These 
variables can be used to predict which borrowers will be more likely to default after forbearance 
is over. This paper does not identify the reasons for higher rates of forbearance among Black 
 
 
homeowners, or reasons for lower rates of refinancing. Future research should consider the 
extent to which this is driven by racial disparities in the probability of experiencing an income 
loss due to the COVID-19 pandemic. 
II: Expectations 
In this section, I briefly summarize prior literature that informs my expectations for the 
factors that influence the take-up of forbearance (and mortgage assistance programs more 
broadly) and mortgage refinancing. These are generally separate literatures, but I draw from both 
since they are used in this paper as competing outcomes. Both bodies of literature inform this 
study by showing past examples of when low-income and minority homeowners seem to make 
suboptimal mortgage decisions during economic downturns (Bucks & Pence, 2008; Collins, 
et.al., 2011; Lambie-Hanson & Reid, 2018; Bhutta & Hizmo, 2020; Eric, et. al., 2019).  
Mortgage decisions are often conceptualized using an options-theoretic framework 
(Hembre et al., 2020). Each month, there is a set of mutually exclusive possible outcomes for a 
mortgage. Borrowers can stay current on their mortgage, default, or prepay. Prepaying on a 
mortgage signifies that the borrower refinanced or sold their home. After the 2020 CARES Act 
was passed, borrowers had the additional option to put their mortgage into forbearance. 
Borrowers are considered current while in forbearance, and thus are not in default even if they 
stop making payments. Financial institutions will not refinance loans in forbearance if the 
borrower is not making payments, but borrowers in forbearance who keep making all their 
payments are able to refinance (FHFA, 2020). 
Borrowers may make decisions regarding their mortgages that appear to be suboptimal 
because of gaps in information. Homeowners with low income and education, as well as elderly 
 
 
and minority homeowners are less likely to know their mortgage terms, in part because the costs 
of acquiring mortgage information may be higher for these populations (Bucks and Pence, 2008). 
A history of low homeownership rates among minority populations in the US has led to fewer 
minority homebuyers today with inherited knowledge about homeownership than white 
homebuyers (Rothstein, 2018). There is also evidence of a knowledge gap when it comes to 
mortgage options during the COVID-19 pandemic. A survey by Fannie Mae in June of 2020 
found that 65% of Hispanic, 51% of Black and 41% of white respondents claimed they were not 
familiar with mortgage relief options (Duncan, 2020).  
 There may also financial factors that can influence mortgage decisions and correlate with 
the race and ethnicity of homeowners, resulting in disparities. Wealth is important for qualifying 
for a good loan but is usually not included in mortgage data. Financial assistance from family 
and friends can also make a large difference in housing outcomes. Inherited household wealth, of 
which Black Americans have significantly less than white Americans, increases the chance that a 
household will own a home (Acolin, et al., 2019). Wealth may not explain differences in take up 
of forbearance, but inability to cover closing costs could keep lower-income borrowers from 
refinancing (DeFusco & Mondragon, 2020). The extent to which these factors are not observed 
and included in analyses can create omitted variable bias, making it difficult to isolate the effects 
of race and ethnicity on mortgage outcomes.  
Refinancing when interest rates drop can make mortgages more affordable for low-
income and racially or ethnically marginalized homeowners (Collins & Reid, 2011). 
Unfortunately, these are the groups of borrowers who face the most barriers to refinancing 
(Lambie-Hanson & Reid, 2018). A study by Bhutta & Hizmo (2020) found that mortgage 
interest rates differ by race in part because Black borrowers originate loans with higher loan to 
 
 
value ratios (LTV) and are less likely to pay “points” to buy down their interest rates than white 
borrowers, resulting in higher interest rates among Black borrowers. Collins and Reid (2011) 
found that loans with high LTVs have a higher chance of foreclosing, and that refinancing the 
loans of Black borrowers eliminates the differential rate of foreclosures between Black and white 
homeowners. A study by Lambie-Hanson & Reid (2018) found that homeowners with low credit 
scores are less likely to refinance than homeowners with high credit scores, and that Black and 
Hispanic borrowers are overrepresented among borrowers with low credit scores. Some of this 
effect is from differential access to government programs to help low-income homeowners 
refinance. Borrowers can only receive a federally backed mortgage if they have a credit score of 
at least 620, and federally backed mortgages can receive perks that private mortgages do not. For 
example, the Home Affordable Refinance Program (HARP) was created to help borrowers 
refinance their loans to in response to the 2007-08 housing market crash, but it was offered only 
to homeowners with federally backed mortgages (Lambie-Hanson & Reid, 2018). All the loans 
in this study were originated through a single affordable mortgage program, so I will be able to 
hold constant differences in loan type that might otherwise make it hard to isolate the effect of 
credit score or race. 
Prior research on the use of mortgage assistance has found some variation by race, but 
these differences may be explained by borrower characteristics. The Home Affordable 
Modification Program (HAMP) was successful in modifying loans without any perceived racial 
discrimination, although financial characteristics certainly played a role in a borrower’s 
likelihood of receiving mortgage relief with low-income borrowers less likely to receive 
modifications than middle- or high-income borrowers (Collins & Reid, 2011). Another study by 
Eric, et.al. (2019) found that borrowers who mistrusted financial institutions were less likely to 
 
 
take up mortgage relief options offered by HARP.  Because of the structure of the forbearance 
program under the CARES Act (e.g., available to anyone with COVID-19 related hardship), take 
up of forbearance should not be dependent on risk characteristics of borrowers. However, 
behavioral characteristics like mistrust of financial institutions or transaction costs associated 
with seeking assistance may play a role in the use of mortgage relief options among low-income 
borrowers. A study of the Ohio Hardest Hit Fund by Russell et. al. (2014) found that distance 
from a brick-and-mortar agency decreased the likelihood that an eligible homeowner would 
apply for mortgage relief. This indicates that transaction costs can create a barrier to take-up of 
mortgage assistance program. Compared to the state-administered Hardest Hit Fund program, 
transaction costs are lower for forbearance during the COVID-19 pandemic because the process 
occurs over the phone and required little documentation.  
III: Research Setting & Data 
 This study uses loan level administrative data from The Ohio Housing Finance Agency 
(OHFA). Housing Finance Agencies (HFAs) provide affordable lending programs to low and 
moderate income (LMI), and often first time, homebuyers. Prior research finds that HFA 
borrowers default and foreclose at a lower rate than similar borrowers of private loans, in part 
because of affordability but also because HFAs offer additional support to borrowers through 
direct servicing and homeownership counselling (Hembre, et al., 2020). For this study, I focus on 
borrowers who purchased a home through OHFA’s affordable mortgage program between 2015 
and 2019, and who still had an active mortgage as of February 2020—the onset of the COVID 
pandemic.  
To measure loan outcomes during COVID, I use monthly data on loan performance from 
February 1, 2020 to February 28, 2021.Origination data collected on each loan includes 
 
 
financial, loan, borrower, house, and family characteristics. Loan outcome data are provided 
monthly, and includes mortgage payment behavior, whether a loan is in forbearance in a given 
month, and when a loan prepays. Zip code level data on percent urban from the 2010 census and 
Home Price Index (HPI) from the Federal Housing Finance Agency are also linked to the OHFA 
data (Untied States Census Bureau, 2019; Federal Housing Finance Agency (2), 2020).  
A weakness of the dataset is that I do not know the reason that a borrower prepays on 
their mortgage. When borrowers prepay, they may be refinancing to lower their interest rate, take 
out home equity, or sell their home. It is possible that OHFA borrowers will refinance at a higher 
rate than borrowers of non-HFA loans when interest rates drop because counseling has been 
shown to increase the likelihood of a borrower refinancing when it is financially optimal to do so 
(Hembre, et al., 2020; Collins, et al., 2013). However, HFA borrowers generally have lower 
interest rates at origination, and thus the value of refinancing is likely lower for these borrowers. 
V: Methodology 
A mortgage can have one of four mutually exclusive possible statuses each month. They 
are (1) forbearance (2) prepay, (3) default (without forbearance), and (4) stay active. For this 
paper, default is defined as being 60 or more days late on the mortgage payment. For the 
purposes of the analysis, I code the status of each loan at quarterly intervals since the onset of the 
COVID pandemic, in February 2020, June 2020, October 2020, and February 2021. Prepayment 
is a terminal outcome; once a borrower enters prepayment, they cannot exit that status in future 
periods.  
Because borrowers who continued to pay their mortgage and have federally insured loans 
can refinance while in forbearance due to an FHFA (2020) rule, I also look at the borrowers in 
 
 
forbearance to determine if any OHFA borrowers in forbearance subsequently prepaid their 
loans. Difference in means tests will be used to identify statistically significant differences in 
homeowner characteristics between groups, including differences in the use of mortgage options 
by race of the homeowner.  
The next step is to explain variations in use of mortgage options by race. I begin with a 
multinomial regression model predicting each of the four competing outcomes as of February 28, 
2021, where the primary explanatory variable is the race of the homeowner. I then use a stepwise 
regression approach to add sets of control variables to identify characteristics that may account 
for (mediate) differential use of mortgage options by race. I repeat these steps, estimating 
regressions of the status of the loans as of June 2020, October 2020, and February 2021. A 
multinomial logistic regression model accounts for competing, unordered, categorical outcomes 
such as the four mortgage options listed above. The sum of the fraction of the population using 
each option is equal 1 since everyone must fall into one of the categories. The reference option is 
“active” as it is the most likely outcome and aligns with the status quo. The probabilities of the 
other options are in relation to the probability of staying active.  
An important explanatory variable for refinancing is the loan’s current interest rate. 
Normally in the literature, call option is used to determine whether it is “in the money” refinance. 
Since the timeframe of this study is only one year, the interest rate on the loan is a sufficient 
indicator of whether the borrower would benefit relative to the others if they refinanced. Race is 
interacted with the loan’s interest rate to test if race moderates the effect of interest rate on the 
decision to refinance. This is an important interaction to consider because a statistically 
significant effect would mean that race, or a confounding variable linked to race, plays a role in 
whether a borrower refinances in response to having a high interest rate. 
 
 
IV: Summary Statistics 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
VARIABLES N mean sd min max 
            
Black 16,096 0.149 0.356 0 1 
Hispanic 16,096 0.0265 0.161 0 1 
Asian or Pacific Islander 16,096 0.0160 0.125 0 1 
White 16,096 0.760 0.427 0 1 
Other Race/Ethnicity 16,096 0.0474 0.213 0 1 
Loan Age 16,124 26.24 15.40 1 60 
CLTV 15,389 0.918 0.0880 0.236 2.039 
Price of Home 15,389 134,711 50,053 22,119 388,230 
Depository or Union 16,124 0.188 0.390 0 1 
Annual Change in Home price 15,389 12,225 12,611 -28,015 96,363 
DPA 16,124 0.819 0.385 0 1 
Age 16,124 34.72 11.57 19 91 
Married 16,122 0.350 0.477 0 1 
Household Size 15,636 2.131 1.285 1 10 
Female 16,119 0.473 0.499 0 1 
Dependents to Employed 15,596 0.474 0.899 0 8 
Disabled or Elderly 15,636 0.0187 0.180 0 4 
Occupation Missing 16,124 0.141 0.348 0 1 
Essential Worker 16,124 0.116 0.320 0 1 
Medical Worker 16,124 0.110 0.312 0 1 
Coborrower 16,124 0.157 0.364 0 1 
Percent Urban of County 16,124 85.03 18.67 0 99.42 
Age of Home 16,121 61.42 29.37 1 220 
Household Income 16,124 47,529 16,509 0 109,577 
Credit Score 16,107 706.1 42.69 350 850 
Coborrower Credit Score 16,124 111.3 258.9 0 832 
 
Table 1 reports the summary statistics for the variables and sample included in the 
regression models (Table 1: Summary Statistics). These variables are derived from both data at 
the time of origination and monthly loan performance. All loans included in this sample were 
originated since 2015 and active as of February 2020. The average borrower in the sample has a 
household income of around $46,000 and a credit score around 700. Just under half of the 
borrowers are female, and most do not have a coborrower. Just under 80% of the borrowers are 
 
 
white and about 15% are Black, with 2.6%, 1.6%, and 4.7% Hispanic, Asian or Pacific Islander, 
and other, respectively. Because the sample of borrowers who identify as a race other than white 
or Black is so small, only the differences between white and Black borrowers are taken as 
potentially significant. The other options for race are included in the regression as controls. 
V: Results 
Table 2 reports a snapshot of loan outcomes for the active sample of loans as of February 
2020, including options for stay current, default, and prepay because forbearance was not yet 
available. The February 2020 snapshot shows the state of the sample of loans directly before the 
onset of the COVID economic shutdown. Before COVID, Black homeowners were nearly 50% 
more likely to default than white homeowners at p<0.001 significance after controlling for other 
available variables (Table 2: Relative Risk Ratios of Default in February 2020). 
Table 3 reports the status of loan outcomes for the same sample of homeowners as of 
June 2020. Fortunately, the number of borrowers in default and not in forbearance dropped by 
about 30% from February to June after forbearance was introduced (Table 3: Relative Risk 
Ratios of Mortgage Options June 2020). Throughout the pandemic, the difference in the 
likelihood of default between Black and white borrowers was reduced until February 2021, when 
there was no statistically significant difference between the default rates of Black and white 
borrowers.  
As indicated in Table 3, Black borrowers were more likely to opt into forbearance than 
white borrowers throughout the pandemic. Black borrowers were 78% more likely to opt into 
forbearance in June 2020 at p<0.001 significance (Table 3: Relative Risk Ratios of Mortgage 
Options June 2020). These results suggest that forbearance was successful in significantly 
 
 
reducing defaults. There is not enough evidence to determine if Black borrowers are more or less 
likely than white borrowers to use forbearance dependent on whether it would be the optimal 
choice. To know whether information gaps or mistrust outlined in the expectations section have 
any racial effect, we would need to know if there is a difference in how likely Black and white 
borrowers are to opt into forbearance if they suffer a loss of income due to the pandemic.  
Unfortunately, Black borrowers were 25% less likely in June 2020 and 43% less likely in 
February 2021 than white borrowers to refinance during the pandemic when market interest rates 
were low. The interaction of loan interest rate with race is insignificant when explaining 
variation in refinancing. This means that Black borrowers are no more or less responsive to their 
interest rate when deciding whether to refinance. Instead, this disparity is likely linked to the 
higher likelihood for Black borrowers to opt into forbearance. Descriptive evidence in line with 
this type of substitution is shown in Figure 1. Borrowers in forbearance are disqualified from 
refinancing if they are not also staying current their payments. Because Black borrowers were 
more likely to default before the pandemic than white borrowers, it stands to reason that Black 
borrowers were also more likely to require assistance from forbearance, and less likely to be able 
to continue making payments while in forbearance, which disqualifies borrowers from 
refinancing. 
 
 
Figure 1: Relative Risk of Mortgage Outcomes if Black
 
 As expected, there are many variables other than race that predict variation in mortgage 
outcomes. Some variables were consistently significant when predicting variation in default 
before and after the introduction of forbearance. A higher credit score and higher household 
income were always associated with a lower risk of default and higher risk of refinancing (Table 
2: Relative Risk Ratios of Default in February 2020; Table 4: Relative Risk Ratios of Mortgage 
Outcomes in February 2021). After forbearance was introduced, borrowers with higher 
household incomes and credit scores were less likely to opt into forbearance (Table 4: Relative 
Risk Ratios of Mortgage Outcomes in February 2021). There were some variables which were 
significant predictors of default before forbearance, were significant for predicting the use of 
forbearance, and were associated with lower changes of refinancing. The race category of Black 
is only one of these characteristics that follow this pattern. Other significant characteristics 
include higher home prices, being a recipient of down payment assistance, older borrowers, 
larger families, and older homes (Table 2: Relative Risk Ratios of Default in February 2020, 
Table 4: Relative Risk Ratios of Mortgage Outcomes in February 2021). These variables are 
important to note because borrowers with these characteristics were more likely to default if they 
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had not used forbearance, and therefore less likely to make payments while in forbearance. This 
makes these borrowers less likely to be able to refinance while interest rates were low. These 
borrowers may also be more likely than others to go into default after leaving forbearance.  
VI: Conclusions 
The outstanding balance on loans in forbearance continues to grow, with interest. 
Permitting and encouraging refinancing for low-income homeowners in forbearance could lessen 
the tide of foreclosures that may occur when forbearance is over. Permitting borrowers in 
forbearance to refinance would also be a step towards better racial equity in the housing market 
as Black borrowers will be likely to leave the COVID pandemic with higher mortgage balances, 
higher interest rates, and greater difficulty making their mortgage payments than white 
borrowers. This policy recommendation is shared by the Urban Institute who cite low credit 
scores among low-income borrowers as a barrier to refinancing (Goodman & Golding, 2021).  
While this paper offers descriptive evidence of disparities in mortgage outcomes by race, 
future research should include data on income shocks. This will provide insights on whether and 
by how much racial inequalities in unemployment lead to racial disparities in mortgage 
outcomes. Further investigation of differences in refinancing by race should more explicitly 
model differences in responsiveness to interest rates, measuring the value of refinancing for each 
borrower (call option). Further research could also interact the income shock and call option 
value with race to see if these variables have differential effects on mortgage outcomes by race.  
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Appendix 
Some variables were transformed to make their coefficients in the regressions easier to interpret. 
All monetary variables are measured by 10 thousand, credit score is by 10 points, and all 
percentages are by 1 ppt. 
Table 2: Relative Risk Ratios of Default in February 2020 
 Race + Loan 
Characteristics 
+Demographics +Financial 
Characteristics 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Default     
     
Asian or Pacific Islander 0.218* 0.196 0.179 0.183 
 (-2.14) (-1.62) (-1.71) (-1.68) 
     
Black 1.742*** 1.571*** 1.597*** 1.497*** 
 (5.56) (4.36) (4.12) (3.52) 
     
Hispanic 0.808 0.797 0.761 0.712 
 (-0.72) (-0.76) (-0.90) (-1.11) 
     
Other Race/Ethnicity 1.146 1.280 1.263 1.297 
 (0.71) (1.24) (1.16) (1.29) 
     
Annual Interest Rate  1.437** 1.433** 1.457** 
  (2.82) (2.71) (2.77) 
     
Loan Age  1.027 1.030* 1.030* 
  (1.92) (2.09) (2.07) 
     
CLTV  1.029*** 1.024** 1.023** 
  (3.68) (3.01) (2.86) 
     
Price of Home  1.007 1.013 1.062*** 
  (0.55) (0.97) (4.01) 
     
Depository or Union  0.781* 0.805 0.858 
  (-2.22) (-1.93) (-1.35) 
     
Annual Change in Home price  1.025 1.045 0.989 
  (0.34) (0.59) (-0.15) 
     
DPA  3.112*** 3.089*** 3.189*** 
 
 
  (3.94) (3.89) (3.91) 
     
Closing Year=2016  0.860 0.965 1.155 
  (-0.80) (-0.18) (0.74) 
     
Closing Year =2017  0.755 0.917 1.111 
  (-0.83) (-0.25) (0.30) 
     
Closing Year =2018  0.532 0.669 0.793 
  (-1.18) (-0.74) (-0.42) 
     
Closing Year =2019  0.222* 0.265 0.308 
  (-2.21) (-1.91) (-1.69) 
     
Closing Year =2020  3.22 x 10-6 8.34 x 10-7 5.26 x 10-7 
  (-0.03) (-0.01) (-0.01) 
     
Age   1.001 1.001 
   (0.28) (0.13) 
     
Married   0.677*** 0.705** 
   (-3.44) (-3.08) 
     
Household Size   1.309*** 1.248*** 
   (5.29) (4.31) 
 
Female   0.797* 0.766** 
   (-2.42) (-2.80) 
     
Dependents to Employed   1.065 1.061 
   (1.10) (1.03) 
     
Disabled or Elderly    0.745 0.715 
   (-1.00) (-1.11) 
     
Occupation Missing   1.157 1.165 
   (0.82) (0.85) 
     
Essential Worker   0.729* 0.761 
   (-2.02) (-1.73) 
     
Medical Worker   0.865 0.976 
   (-0.98) (-0.16) 
     
Coborrower   0.502*** 1.441 
   (-4.54) (0.28) 
 
 
     
Percent Urban of County   0.993** 0.994* 
   (-3.12) (-2.51) 
     
Age of Home   1.005** 1.005** 
   (3.03) (2.82) 
     
Household Income    0.820*** 
    (-5.85) 
     
Credit Score    0.897*** 
    (-9.72) 
     
Coborrower Credit Score    0.982 
    (-1.00) 
Observations 16124 15389 15341 15325 
Pseudo R2 0.008 0.063 0.092 0.116 
Exponentiated coefficients; t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
  
Table 3: Relative Risk Ratios of Mortgage Options June 2020 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Outcome Outcome Outcome Outcome 
Default     
Asian or Pacific Islander 0.462 0.572 0.539 0.557 
 (-1.32) (-0.78) (-0.86) (-0.81) 
     
Black 1.684*** 1.597*** 1.643*** 1.532** 
 (4.19) (3.66) (3.56) (3.05) 
     
Hispanic 0.993 1.018 1.012 0.965 
 (-0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (-0.11) 
     
Other Race/Ethnicity 0.938 1.046 1.041 1.057 
 (-0.25) (0.17) (0.15) (0.21) 
     
Annual Interest Rate  1.404* 1.397* 1.437* 
  (2.23) (2.15) (2.29) 
     
Loan Age  1.021 1.028 1.027 
  (1.25) (1.62) (1.54) 
     
CLTV  1.036*** 1.031*** 1.030** 
  (4.09) (3.48) (3.27) 
     
Price of Home  1.027 1.035* 1.077*** 
  (1.76) (2.10) (4.16) 
     
Depository or Union  0.762* 0.781 0.833 
  (-2.01) (-1.81) (-1.33) 
     
Annual Change in Home 
price 
 0.974 1.001 0.949 
  (-0.30) (0.01) (-0.59) 
     
DPA  2.242** 2.255** 2.255** 
  (2.67) (2.67) (2.61) 
     
Closing Year=2016  0.751 0.888 1.075 
  (-1.27) (-0.51) (0.31) 
     
Closing Year =2017  0.566 0.752 0.890 
  (-1.40) (-0.69) (-0.28) 
     
Closing Year =2018  0.362 0.509 0.578 
 
 
  (-1.58) (-1.03) (-0.83) 
     
Closing Year =2019  0.111** 0.146* 0.160* 
  (-2.68) (-2.29) (-2.17) 
     
Closing Year =2020  0.000000754 0.000000434 0.000000314 
  (-0.02) (-0.01) (-0.01) 
     
Age   1.011* 1.010* 
   (2.42) (2.20) 
     
Married   0.653** 0.682** 
   (-3.15) (-2.82) 
     
Household Size   1.306*** 1.235*** 
   (4.41) (3.46) 
     
Female   0.777* 0.762* 
   (-2.23) (-2.37) 
     
Dependents to 
Employed 
  1.051 1.048 
   (0.72) (0.66) 
     
Disabled or Elderly in 
HH 
  0.916 0.900 
   (-0.31) (-0.37) 
     
Occupation Missing   1.525* 1.550* 
   (2.07) (2.14) 
     
Essential Worker   0.867 0.918 
   (-0.81) (-0.48) 
     
Medical Worker   0.944 1.046 
   (-0.32) (0.25) 
     
Coborrower   0.662* 2.895 
   (-2.48) (0.83) 
     
Percent Urban of 
County 
  0.991** 0.993** 
   (-3.18) (-2.60) 
     
Age of Home   1.006** 1.005** 
   (2.96) (2.77) 
 
 
     
Household Income    0.858*** 
    (-3.85) 
     
Credit Score    0.884*** 
    (-9.73) 
     
Coborrower Credit 
Score 
   0.977 
    (-1.27) 
     
Prepay     
Asian or Pacific Islander 0.439 0.346* 0.354* 0.383 
 (-1.62) (-2.06) (-1.99) (-1.84) 
     
Black 0.663** 0.643** 0.733 0.749 
 (-2.66) (-2.75) (-1.84) (-1.71) 
     
Hispanic 0.567 0.621 0.643 0.663 
 (-1.57) (-1.31) (-1.21) (-1.12) 
     
Other Race/Ethnicity 1.103 1.023 1.054 1.080 
 (0.49) (0.11) (0.26) (0.38) 
     
Annual Interest Rate  1.823*** 1.774*** 1.732*** 
  (4.36) (4.11) (3.94) 
     
Loan Age  0.905*** 0.904*** 0.903*** 
  (-6.20) (-6.26) (-6.29) 
     
CLTV  0.992 0.993 0.992 
  (-0.97) (-0.81) (-0.89) 
     
Price of Home  1.107*** 1.104*** 1.082*** 
  (9.12) (8.07) (5.81) 
     
Depository or Union  1.219 1.202 1.182 
  (1.76) (1.62) (1.47) 
     
Annual Change in Home 
price 
 0.880 0.862* 0.876 
  (-1.78) (-2.01) (-1.78) 
     
DPA  0.521** 0.564** 0.586* 
  (-3.16) (-2.75) (-2.56) 
     
 
 
Closing Year =2016  0.245*** 0.224*** 0.215*** 
  (-5.99) (-6.31) (-6.45) 
     
Closing Year =2017  0.0591*** 0.0535*** 0.0511*** 
  (-6.94) (-7.13) (-7.21) 
     
Closing Year =2018  0.00890*** 0.00845*** 0.00806*** 
  (-7.39) (-7.44) (-7.47) 
     
Closing Year =2019  0.00172*** 0.00170*** 0.00165*** 
  (-8.09) (-8.09) (-8.10) 
     
Closing Year =2020  3.44e-09 1.69e-09 9.93e-10 
  (-0.03) (-0.02) (-0.01) 
     
Age   0.972*** 0.971*** 
   (-5.49) (-5.58) 
     
Married   1.185 1.166 
   (1.33) (1.19) 
     
Household Size   0.834* 0.849* 
   (-2.32) (-2.07) 
     
Female   0.863 0.883 
   (-1.47) (-1.23) 
     
Dependents to 
Employed 
  1.060 1.052 
   (0.60) (0.52) 
     
Disabled or Elderly in 
HH 
  1.455 1.475 
   (1.70) (1.77) 
     
Occupation Missing   0.668* 0.662* 
   (-2.13) (-2.17) 
     
Essential Worker   0.947 0.942 
   (-0.38) (-0.41) 
     
Medical Worker   0.955 0.893 
   (-0.30) (-0.72) 
     
Coborrower   0.962 1.292 
   (-0.29) (0.21) 
 
 
     
Percent Urban of 
County 
  1.004 1.003 
   (1.41) (1.14) 
     
Age of Home   0.996* 0.996* 
   (-2.16) (-2.19) 
     
Household Income    1.106** 
    (2.88) 
     
Credit Score    1.026* 
    (2.29) 
     
Coborrower Credit 
Score 
   0.998 
    (-0.13) 
     
     
Forbearance     
Asian or Pacific Islander 0.956 1.248 1.087 1.028 
 (-0.22) (1.03) (0.38) (0.13) 
     
Black 2.134*** 2.042*** 1.890*** 1.787*** 
 (12.96) (11.74) (9.69) (8.75) 
     
Hispanic 1.410* 1.395* 1.215 1.161 
 (2.47) (2.35) (1.36) (1.03) 
     
Other Race/Ethnicity 1.212 1.267* 1.215 1.170 
 (1.72) (2.05) (1.68) (1.34) 
     
Annual Interest Rate  1.163* 1.168* 1.228** 
  (2.12) (2.14) (2.78) 
     
Loan Age  1.000 0.998 0.998 
  (-0.00) (-0.28) (-0.28) 
     
CLTV  1.024*** 1.023*** 1.021*** 
  (4.53) (4.26) (3.93) 
     
Price of Home  1.022*** 1.018* 1.050*** 
  (3.37) (2.57) (6.24) 
     
Depository or Union  0.795*** 0.807** 0.836** 
  (-3.43) (-3.20) (-2.65) 
 
 
     
Annual Change in Home 
price 
 1.073 1.070 1.027 
  (1.60) (1.52) (0.60) 
     
DPA  1.465** 1.423** 1.301* 
  (3.17) (2.90) (2.13) 
     
Closing Year =2016  0.763* 0.752* 0.872 
  (-2.16) (-2.23) (-1.06) 
     
Closing Year =2017  0.698 0.677 0.772 
  (-1.73) (-1.84) (-1.21) 
     
Closing Year =2018  0.703 0.673 0.734 
  (-1.09) (-1.21) (-0.94) 
     
Closing Year =2019  0.623 0.582 0.624 
  (-1.19) (-1.34) (-1.16) 
     
Closing Year =2020  0.513 0.504 0.541 
  (-1.02) (-1.04) (-0.93) 
     
Age   0.998 0.997 
   (-0.93) (-1.17) 
     
Married   0.867* 0.890 
   (-2.20) (-1.78) 
     
Household Size   1.188*** 1.129*** 
   (5.37) (3.73) 
     
Female   0.910 0.882* 
   (-1.77) (-2.33) 
     
Dependents to 
Employed 
  1.036 1.043 
   (0.93) (1.09) 
     
Disabled or Elderly   1.026 0.977 
   (0.20) (-0.17) 
     
Occupation Missing   0.892 0.900 
   (-1.37) (-1.24) 
     
Essential Worker   0.873 0.923 
 
 
   (-1.61) (-0.94) 
     
Medical Worker   0.913 0.999 
   (-1.06) (-0.01) 
     
Coborrower   0.828* 1.049 
   (-2.48) (0.07) 
     
Percent Urban of 
County 
  1.003* 1.004** 
   (2.10) (2.76) 
     
Age of Home   1.001 1.001 
   (1.15) (1.10) 
     
Household Income    0.888*** 
    (-6.35) 
     
Credit Score    0.913*** 
    (-13.53) 
     
Coborrower Credit 
Score 
   0.995 
    (-0.57) 
     
Observations 16124 15389 15341 15325 
Pseudo R2 0.009 0.039 0.052 0.069 
Exponentiated coefficients; t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
  
 
 
Table 4: Relative Risk Ratios of Mortgage Outcomes in February 2021 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Outcome Outcome Outcome Outcome 
Default     
Asian or Pacific Islander 0.237* 0.192 0.185 0.179 
 (-2.02) (-1.64) (-1.67) (-1.70) 
     
Black 1.210 1.111 1.106 1.042 
 (1.51) (0.81) (0.73) (0.30) 
     
Hispanic 1.179 1.201 1.138 1.074 
 (0.61) (0.67) (0.47) (0.26) 
     
Other Race/Ethnicity 0.918 1.014 1.009 1.008 
 (-0.37) (0.06) (0.04) (0.03) 
     
Annual Interest Rate  1.315* 1.280 1.313 
  (1.98) (1.76) (1.92) 
     
Loan Age  0.915*** 0.913*** 0.913*** 
  (-5.88) (-5.89) (-5.90) 
     
CLTV  1.033*** 1.030** 1.028** 
  (3.61) (3.20) (2.96) 
     
Price of Home  1.022 1.024 1.068*** 
  (1.56) (1.54) (3.96) 
     
Depository or Union  0.628*** 0.622*** 0.657** 
  (-3.43) (-3.45) (-3.05) 
     
Annual Change in Home 
price 
 1.020 1.034 0.981 
  (0.23) (0.39) (-0.22) 
     
DPA  2.479*** 2.488*** 2.410** 
  (3.30) (3.31) (3.16) 
     
Closing Year=2016  0.285*** 0.296*** 0.354*** 
  (-5.83) (-5.53) (-4.68) 
     
Closing Year=2017  0.0595*** 0.0638*** 0.0765*** 
  (-7.45) (-7.15) (-6.65) 
     
Closing Year=2018  0.0120*** 0.0127*** 0.0148*** 
 
 
  (-7.45) (-7.26) (-6.99) 
     
Closing Year=2019  0.00190*** 0.00188*** 0.00213*** 
  (-8.47) (-8.36) (-8.17) 
     
Closing Year=2020  7.29e-09 3.19e-09 2.02e-08 
  (-0.04) (-0.02) (-0.05) 
     
Age   1.002 1.001 
   (0.44) (0.30) 
     
Married   0.642*** 0.664** 
   (-3.43) (-3.17) 
     
Household Size   1.225*** 1.160* 
   (3.39) (2.45) 
     
Female   0.856 0.822 
   (-1.49) (-1.86) 
     
Dependents to 
Employed 
  1.060 1.067 
   (0.83) (0.92) 
     
Disabled or Elderly in 
HH 
  0.893 0.866 
   (-0.36) (-0.46) 
     
Occupation Missing   1.010 1.023 
   (0.05) (0.12) 
     
Essential Worker   0.777 0.813 
   (-1.51) (-1.23) 
     
Medical Worker   0.724 0.815 
   (-1.86) (-1.17) 
     
Coborrower   0.702* 3.136 
   (-2.26) (0.88) 
     
Percent Urban of 
County 
  0.995 0.997 
   (-1.79) (-1.30) 
     
Age of Home   1.002 1.002 
   (1.05) (1.02) 
 
 
     
Household Income    0.838*** 
    (-4.68) 
     
Credit Score    0.899*** 
    (-8.84) 
     
Coborrower Credit 
Score 
   0.976 
    (-1.30) 
     
Prepay     
Asian or Pacific Islander 0.671 0.323*** 0.314*** 0.339*** 
 (-1.80) (-4.03) (-4.04) (-3.73) 
     
Black 0.585*** 0.528*** 0.570*** 0.573*** 
 (-6.09) (-6.10) (-5.10) (-5.00) 
     
Hispanic 0.600** 0.596* 0.595* 0.611* 
 (-2.68) (-2.32) (-2.29) (-2.14) 
     
Other Race/Ethnicity 0.916 0.812 0.835 0.866 
 (-0.74) (-1.44) (-1.24) (-0.98) 
     
Annual Interest Rate  2.264*** 2.141*** 2.082*** 
  (8.79) (8.04) (7.73) 
     
Loan Age  0.645*** 0.645*** 0.644*** 
  (-40.72) (-40.36) (-40.21) 
     
CLTV  0.989 0.992 0.991 
  (-1.78) (-1.29) (-1.48) 
     
Price of Home  1.093*** 1.084*** 1.057*** 
  (11.61) (9.52) (5.92) 
     
Depository or Union  1.223** 1.190* 1.168 
  (2.58) (2.19) (1.95) 
     
Annual Change in Home 
price 
 0.905* 0.888* 0.906 
  (-1.96) (-2.29) (-1.88) 
     
DPA  0.473*** 0.515*** 0.545*** 
  (-5.28) (-4.61) (-4.18) 
     
 
 
Closing Year=2016  0.00920*** 0.00847*** 0.00803*** 
  (-28.02) (-28.07) (-28.18) 
     
Closing Year=2017  0.0000341*** 0.0000322*** 0.0000303*** 
  (-36.23) (-35.94) (-35.88) 
     
Closing Year=2018  6.52e-08*** 6.73e-08*** 6.28e-08*** 
  (-37.88) (-37.40) (-37.26) 
     
Closing Year=2019  6.89e-10*** 7.79e-10*** 7.36e-10*** 
  (-39.49) (-38.95) (-38.76) 
     
Closing Year=2020  2.62e-11*** 3.71e-11*** 3.47e-11*** 
  (-20.68) (-20.40) (-20.42) 
     
Age   0.979*** 0.978*** 
   (-6.78) (-6.99) 
     
Married   1.196* 1.184* 
   (2.10) (1.97) 
     
Household Size   0.820*** 0.840*** 
   (-3.90) (-3.38) 
     
Female   0.920 0.957 
   (-1.26) (-0.66) 
     
Dependents to 
Employed 
  1.092 1.077 
   (1.38) (1.16) 
     
Disabled or Elderly in 
HH 
  1.262 1.281 
   (1.43) (1.53) 
     
Occupation Missing   0.565*** 0.559*** 
   (-5.17) (-5.24) 
     
Essential Worker   0.930 0.927 
   (-0.75) (-0.78) 
     
Medical Worker   0.822 0.752** 
   (-1.81) (-2.60) 
     
Coborrower   1.230* 3.572 
   (2.28) (1.78) 
 
 
     
Percent Urban of 
County 
  1.006** 1.005** 
   (3.00) (2.61) 
     
Age of Home   0.994*** 0.994*** 
   (-4.56) (-4.67) 
     
Household Income    1.137*** 
    (5.45) 
     
Credit Score    1.033*** 
    (4.30) 
     
Coborrower Credit 
Score 
   0.988 
    (-1.26) 
Forbearance     
Asian or Pacific Islander 0.587* 0.748 0.669 0.641 
 (-2.21) (-1.09) (-1.50) (-1.64) 
     
Black 1.941*** 1.842*** 1.788*** 1.689*** 
 (11.26) (9.94) (8.69) (7.76) 
     
Hispanic 1.209 1.199 1.055 1.009 
 (1.31) (1.23) (0.36) (0.06) 
     
Other Race/Ethnicity 0.912 0.997 0.967 0.940 
 (-0.75) (-0.03) (-0.27) (-0.48) 
     
Annual Interest Rate  1.015 1.037 1.080 
  (0.22) (0.53) (1.10) 
     
Loan Age  0.998 0.997 0.996 
  (-0.22) (-0.40) (-0.47) 
     
CLTV  1.037*** 1.034*** 1.032*** 
  (6.56) (6.00) (5.54) 
     
Price of Home  1.018** 1.015* 1.045*** 
  (2.62) (1.97) (5.43) 
     
Depository or Union  0.869* 0.883 0.916 
  (-2.12) (-1.87) (-1.31) 
     
Annual Change in Home  1.120* 1.125* 1.076 
 
 
price 
  (2.46) (2.52) (1.58) 
     
DPA  1.876*** 1.805*** 1.683*** 
  (5.22) (4.85) (4.21) 
     
Closing Year=2016  0.746* 0.758* 0.886 
  (-2.31) (-2.13) (-0.92) 
     
Closing Year=2017  0.782 0.789 0.907 
  (-1.21) (-1.14) (-0.47) 
     
Closing Year=2018  0.829 0.823 0.902 
  (-0.60) (-0.61) (-0.32) 
     
Closing Year=2019  0.657 0.642 0.693 
  (-1.09) (-1.13) (-0.93) 
     
Closing Year=2020  0.487 0.495 0.538 
  (-1.11) (-1.08) (-0.94) 
     
Age   0.992** 0.992*** 
   (-3.25) (-3.51) 
     
Married   0.892 0.918 
   (-1.75) (-1.29) 
     
Household Size   1.232*** 1.170*** 
   (6.53) (4.84) 
     
Female   0.940 0.911 
   (-1.13) (-1.69) 
     
Dependents to 
Employed 
  1.042 1.049 
   (1.08) (1.26) 
     
Disabled or Elderly in 
HH 
  1.199 1.153 
   (1.39) (1.05) 
     
Occupation Missing   0.950 0.959 
   (-0.61) (-0.49) 
     
Essential Worker   0.883 0.941 
   (-1.46) (-0.71) 
 
 
     
Medical Worker   0.907 0.991 
   (-1.12) (-0.10) 
     
Coborrower   0.730*** 1.492 
   (-3.98) (0.56) 
     
Percent Urban of 
County 
  1.000 1.001 
   (0.16) (0.85) 
     
Age of Home   1.002* 1.002* 
   (2.44) (2.43) 
     
Household Income    0.894*** 
    (-5.91) 
     
Credit Score    0.908*** 
    (-13.90) 
     
Coborrower Credit 
Score 
   0.988 
    (-1.20) 
     
Observations 16124 15389 15341 15325 
Pseudo R2       0.008       0.146       0.160       0.175 
Exponentiated coefficients; t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
